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A B S T R A C T
In the contested space of energy production in Canada, tension and a series of disputes over land and
rights have arisen between the state, industry and local Aboriginal communities. Canadian governments
have long exploited the bountiful natural resources of the land, while at the same time attempting to
reconcile a difﬁcult relationship with its Aboriginal communities. This case study reveals how the
government has yielded responsibility to industry to resolve the many governance challenges of Canada’s
extractive hot zone. Through substantial delegation of governance duties to industry, the Canadian
Government has placed large parts of its regulatory toolbox in the hands of multinational Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR) departments, and hence turned social and environmental planning and
programming into corporate stakeholder management. This article sets out to explain these dramatic
changes in governance power play and practice by examining the case of the extractive hot zone in
Alberta, according to three distinct but interlinked trajectories in governance and CSR scholarship,
namely the change from “government” to “governance”, the emergence of a claimed post-political
condition and the evolution of CSR practices towards stakeholder management.
ã 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Responsibility (CSR)
In both the management literature and other areas, the growing
body of research into Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
indicates a ﬁeld that has become rather polarized between
proponents and opponents of a concept that over the past 20 years
has been transformed from an irrelevant and often frowned-upon
idea to one of the most orthodox and widely accepted concepts in
the business world (Lee, 2008). As always, orthodoxy should be
treated with caution, and by exploring case studies researchers can
elaborate on and scrutinize the role of CSR and its implications.
For decades, encounters between global enterprises and local
communities have been represented in geographical terms, and
this article is no exception. The case study here of the Norwegian
oil company Statoil and its ventures in the extractive hot zone of
Canada provides insights into the workings of social, material and
historical realities, challenging the image of CSR and its wider
implications for societal governance.
The global energy market in general and the extractive hot
zones more speciﬁcally are fertile ground for governance
innovations; hence, they are excellent sites for studying emergingE-mail address: tarje.wanvik@uib.no (T.I. Wanvik).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2016.01.007
2214-790X/ã 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article ungovernance practices. The activities of the extractive industry have
had a great impact on the social, cultural and environmental
realities in these zones (Gamu et al., 2015; LeClerc and Keeling,
2015; Veltmeyer and Bowles, 2014; Virah-Sawmy, 2015). Although
there have been immense beneﬁts for Canadian society, the burden
shouldered by local ecosystems and Aboriginal communities is
substantial, which adds up to a prolonged historical conﬂict
between the Crown and its Aboriginal citizens over rights and
entitlements (Cairns, 2000; Veltmeyer and Bowles, 2014). The
reciprocal arrangement between industry and government on the
one hand and local communities on the other has been observed to
be skewed, with insufﬁcient contribution to local development and
fulﬁlment of Aboriginal rights and entitlements (Dembicki, 2012;
Dow, 2012; Foster, 2008; Kelly et al., 2010).
Historically, the governance structure of Canada’s extractive hot
zones has been dominated by two groups of actors, namely
governments at all levels and industry (Hoberg and Phillips, 2011).
Huge efforts have been invested by these two sectors in developing
a previously uneconomic energy commodity (bitumen) into a
highly proﬁtable enterprise, resulting in a thriving industrial
venture (Sherval, 2015). However, this has not come without cost;
bitumen extraction has reinforced past grievances among local
Aboriginal communities, which have once again being deprived of
their hard-earned access to traditional territories (Black et al.,
2014; Huseman and Short, 2012; Jamasmie, 2014).der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Crown has facilitated the emergence of ﬂexible governance
innovations, comprised of three tangible measures, namely
consultation, environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and
impact and beneﬁt agreements (IBAs) (Grifﬁn, 2012; Harvey and
Bice, 2014; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Reich, 2008; Solomon et al.,
2008). These measures are based on the following objectives. All
concerned parties (stakeholders) are to be (1) consulted and should
make valuable contributions to governance processes; (2) invited
to participate in assessments of planned interventions; and (3)
expected to reach agreements based on certain minimum levels of
consensus, so-called positive-sum games or win–win solutions
(Jacobsson and Garsten, 2012). Only through governance struc-
tures based on pragmatic “what works” criteria—the discourse
goes—can proper management of the extractive hot zones be
exercised (Jones, 2008).
Accordingly, industry has been delegated extensive responsi-
bilities for the use of governance instruments. Consequently, by
encouraging companies to comply with international CSR stand-
ards, and by facilitating “beyond compliance activities”, the Alberta
government has put private interests in the driver’s seat of the
governance framework of the extractive hot zone.
To understand how these governance innovations emerged, and
what their impact and consequences have been, we must examine
recent developments in three different but related strands of
thought in governance and CSR scholarship. The ﬁrst relates to the
conventional shift from government to governance, a development
characterized by a move from hierarchical, representational
government by institutions under majority rule, to more
networked, egalitarian stakeholder relations based on alleged
consensus (see for example Bingham et al., 2005; Braithwaite and
Levi, 2003; Jessop, 1997; Jones, 1998; Rhodes, 1997, 2007). The
second development relates to the ﬁrst, but goes further by
identifying a radically interpreted, particular post-political condi-
tion, namely the emergence of a managerial, elitist space emptied
of politics where decisions are based on pragmatic “what works”
criteria (see for example Agamben et al., 2009; Brown, 2005;
Crouch, 2000; Mouffe, 1999, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2005, 2011;
Žižek, 1999). The third feature is the incremental evolution of CSR
towards stakeholder management. This change in corporate
practices can be viewed as a response to changing governing
preferences, together with an increased maturity in CSR imple-
mentation, primarily among multinational companies, where
traditional philanthropic, standardized and image-based CSR has
been replaced by an allegedly collaborative, performance-driven
and integrated practice (Brammer et al., 2012; Dentchev et al.,
2015; Porter and Kramer, 2006; Scherer et al., 2014; Solomon et al.,
2008; Visser, 2013). This is in line with what scholars have
identiﬁed as a more “inclusive business model” (Virah-Sawmy,
2015).
By following Statoil’s1 journey into the vast prairies of Alberta, I
show how companies have become an integral part of the new
governance structure of Canada through their pragmatic quest for
a social licence to operate. Multinational companies have
encountered a highly politicized space in the extractive hot zone,
and from a mix of formal consultations, corporate self-assessments
and bilateral negotiations, we see the emergence of hybrid1 Statoil Canada Ltd. (Statoil) developed and operates the Kai Kos Dehseh (KKD)
leases, which contain more than two billion barrels of estimated recoverable
resources. Statoil employs more than 800 people, with its headquarters in Calgary,
Alberta. Established by the Norwegian government in 1972, Statoil has grown to
become one of Europe’s leading oil and gas companies. The company operates 60%
of all Norwegian oil and gas production (in (Vaaland and Heide, 2008)), and is
Norway’s largest single company with a net operating income of NOK 110 billion in
2014 (in (Statoil, 2014)).governance structures, and more speciﬁcally the emergence of
governance as corporate stakeholder management, in which industry
plays the leading role.
This article is based on data collection and extensive ﬁeldwork
conducted from 2014 to 2015 in the extractive hot zone of Alberta,
in a very challenging research environment where information is
difﬁcult to access, and vital parts of the governance practice are
“out of reach” to outsiders (Jenkins et al., 2015). This particular case
evolved from my gaining access to some vital key informants in an
operating company (Statoil), a multi-stakeholder institution
(CEMA) and some key local communities in the study area of
interest: from Fort McKay in the north to Cold Lake in the east, and
from Métis Crossing in the west to Calgary in the south. Interviews
were conducted with Aboriginal community leaders, elders and
representatives, government ofﬁcials, consultants, lawyers and
CSR ofﬁcers and managers.2 Fortunately, two Aboriginal commu-
nities provided access to important traditional land use studies.
Additionally, countless pages of EIAs, manuals, guiding principles,
strategies and Supreme Court decisions on Aboriginal rights and
title were analysed. This illustrative case of Statoil in Alberta could
have been conducted with other companies and stakeholders
elsewhere in similar contexts, and serves here to shed light on the
pragmatic adaptive processes of companies responding to
changing governance preferences in the relationship between
the extractive industry and society.
2. The extractive hot zone of Conklin, Alberta
The oil sands region of Canada is primarily situated in the north-
eastern part of the province of Alberta, until recently relatively
sparsely populated by various Aboriginal groups of First Nations or
Métis3 origin. As in many extraction zones, the oil sands region
encompasses traditional lands of Aboriginal people. Today, in the
midst of the Athabasca bitumen area is Conklin, the closest
community to where Statoil operates. Conklin is a small
community of Métis people in the municipality of Wood Buffalo,
Alberta (Fig. 1).
Despite its isolation, Conklin is a community that is at the
centre of the oil sands development. Here, the Métis people have
practised trapping, hunting, ﬁshing and harvesting for over a
hundred years, living off the land. Steam-assisted gravity drainage
operations combined with ancillary high-voltage transmission
lines and bitumen pipelines have greatly impacted the area.
According to the community, the traditional harvesting territory of
the Conklin Métis covers about 10,000 km2, stretching from Wiau
and Grist Lakes in the south to Algar and Gordon Lakes in the north
(Fig. 2) (Golder Associates, 2011). The traditional way of life based
on hunting, ﬁshing, trapping and gathering is quickly becoming
impossible for the Métis of Conklin (Conklin Métis Local #193,
2012).
Today, community members ﬁnd it increasingly difﬁcult to
access traditional lands. Old trails have been destroyed or
upgraded into roads for trucking, numerous new seismic cut lines
have been created throughout formerly intact lands and long-
standing routes have been restricted or blocked by oil developers
(Conklin Métis Local #193, 2012:36). Development has caused a
rapid decline in the numbers of animals, berries and plants, as well
as a decrease in air and water quality (ibid:72). In addition, the2 Some interviewees remain anonymous, according to their wishes and in general
consideration of the vulnerability of certain contributors to this study.
3 The Métis are recognized in the Constitution Act of 1982 as one of Canada’s
three Aboriginal peoples. The term Métis did not have a precise deﬁnition until the
latter half of the 19th century, when it clearly described people of mixed French and
native ancestry.
Fig. 1. Conklin Métis community surrounded by industrial developments (“Bylaw No. 13/024, Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo,” 2013).
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community are devastating, with substance abuse, alcoholism,
high crime rates and poor living conditions taking a heavy toll of its
inhabitants (interview with head of Conklin Resource Develop-
ment Advisory Committee, 2015).
The history of the Conklin Métis is a microcosm of the complex
history of the Métis (and other Aboriginal peoples) in Canada,
which has been characterized throughout modern Canadian
history by recurring cycles of settlement, displacement, dispos-
session and dispersion of Métis people from traditional homelands
and movements to new lands (Conklin Métis Local #193, 2012).
The province of Alberta and the regional municipality of Wood
Buffalo struggle to govern this complex landscape of industrial
developments and traditional ways of life.
3. Governance theories and corporate responses
In the governance of complex societies, it appears to be a truism
that there are a multitude of concerned parties. Theories of
complex systems and networks have recently formed the basis of
applied governance approaches to the participation of concerned
parties or stakeholders (Dentchev et al., 2015; Dicken et al., 2001;
Harvey and Bice, 2014; Jacobsson and Garsten, 2012; Jones, 1998;
Reich, 2008; Sunley, 2008). The parties in such forms of governance
participate (or are allowed to participate) in these decision-making
relational networks because of their “stakes” in the issues that
these forms of governance are intended to address (Swyngedouw,
2005: 1995). In the following sections, we revisit three basic
notions behind the emergence of what I term governance as
corporate stakeholder management. To understand these changing
features of governance, we must examine three different but
interrelated developments in the governance and managementliterature, combined with subsequent changes among CSR practi-
tioners.
3.1. From government to governance
The concept of “governance” is used in many subdisciplines of
the social sciences. Common elements emphasized are co-
operation to enhance legitimacy, the effectiveness of governing
societies, new processes and public–private arrangements (Kooi-
man, 2003). Traditionally, governing is what governments do—
they control the allocation of resources between social actors, and
provide a set of rules and operate a set of institutions to do so. Thus,
governing involves the establishment of a basic set of relationships
between governments and their citizens, which differ from highly
structured and state-controlled hierarchical arrangements to those
egalitarian or “plurilateral” society-driven ones that are monitored
only loosely and informally, if at all (Howlett et al., 2009). In its
broadest sense, “governance” is a term used to describe the mode
of increased government co-ordination exercised by public and
private actors in their efforts to solve problems of collective action
inherent in government and governing (De Bruijn and Ernst, 1995;
Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000; Kooiman, 2000; Rhodes, 1996). The
driving force behind this development is said to be the increased
recognition of societal complexity, and a growing awareness that
governments are not the only crucial actor to address major
societal challenges (Kooiman and Van Vliet, 2000).
Governance of the extractive hot zone of Alberta can be said to
be a process by which an ever-wider range of actors is drawn into
governing processes thought to be characterized not by rules,
regulations and the exercise of hierarchical authority, but by
informal networks claimed to be egalitarian that focus upon
partnerships and networks and the blurring of the boundaries
between public and private sectors.
Fig. 2. Conklin Métis Local #193 harvesting area (based on Golder Associates, 2011).
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Although governance has gained considerable attention and
endorsement, an inﬂuential group of scholars has strongly
criticized its alleged crippling effects on democracy and participa-
tion (Mouffe, 2005; Rhodes, 2007; Swyngedouw, 2005, 2010). As
Lemke (2007) points out, for all the positive aspects associated
with the shift towards governance, there are also questions about
its ability to improve democratic processes, not least about how it
can potentially marginalize conﬂicts between groups or underplay
contradictions between political objectives and actions—a condi-
tion referred to as “post-political” (Swyngedouw, 2010).
The post-political condition is held to be one where contesta-
tion and conﬂict are supplanted by consensus-based politics
(Butler et al., 2000). Central to this view is Mouffe’s distinction
between the “political” as the space of power, conﬂict and
antagonism within human societies, and “politics”, described as
“the set of practices and institutions through which an order is
created, organizing human coexistence in the context of con-
ﬂictuality provided by the political” (Mouffe, 2005:9).
Post-political analysis offers potentially useful insights into the
framing of recent changes to governance systems, especially what
is understood to be within the remit of governance, and who
engages with a system and under what terms (Allmendinger and
Haughton, 2012). According to Oosterlynck and Swyngedouw
(2010), the new forms of governmentality that have arisen over the
past decades have formed with the consensus—despite often
conﬂicting agendas and lifestyles—that managerial–technological
apparatuses should permit the negotiation of conﬂicts in such away as to arrive at mutually beneﬁcial policy formulations. This
amounts to colonization of the political by managerial–technolog-
ical governance that has erased the gap between the political and
policies, resulting in depoliticization (Oosterlynck and Swynge-
douw, 2010).
3.3. Changing CSR frameworks
These changing spaces of governance correspond with develop-
ments within the ﬁeld of CSR. The basic concept of CSR is that
corporations are a vital part of society, and that they have both the
power and the responsibility to conduct their affairs in ways that
satisfy not only shareholders, but also other constituencies such as
employees, customers, the environment and the community at
large (Eijsbouts, 2011). Since the 1950s, CSR has increasingly
become a buzzword in corporate–community relations. CSR has
especially taken hold within extractive industries, ﬁrst as a tool
used by NGOs to police multinational mining or energy companies
operating in the Global South (Dupuy, 2014; Harvey, 2014; Virah-
Sawmy, 2015). Later, business gained control over its own CSR
activities, leading to a proliferation of business-led CSR initiatives,
concerning both international CSR standards and CSR reporting
(Frynas, 2005; Harvey, 2014).
In the CSR literature, the principle of voluntarism is predomi-
nant and requires responsible business activities to be value based
(Bowen and Johnson, 1953), discretionary and to extend beyond
legal requirements (Carroll and Shabana, 2010; Dentchev et al.,
2015; Eijsbouts, 2011; Lee, 2008). Among the many critics of
voluntarism, Rajak (2011) states that CSR has evolved from a
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their act” to a discourse of unity and partnership led by
corporations themselves. Describing the historical development
from activist-oriented naming and shaming of multinational
companies to a more industry-led, self-inﬂicted social conscious-
ness, Rajak claims that the moral economies of responsibility,
generosity and community—and the social bonds of affection and
coercion that these create—have become not the weapons of the
weak, but the weapons of the powerful (ibid.).
A transformative concept within this critical development has
been stakeholder management, a term ﬁrst coined by Freeman in
1984 (2010). Maintaining “a licence to operate” is perceived to be a
constant challenge (Harvey, 2014; Jenkins and Yakovleva, 2006;
Virah-Sawmy, 2015), and for the extractive industries, CSR is about
balancing the diverse demands of a wide array of stakeholders,
with the ever-present need to make a proﬁt (Jenkins, 2004). The
stakeholder model of CSR was developed mainly by management
scholars who were frustrated by the lack of practicality of the
previous theoretical models. A stakeholder refers to any individual
or group that maintains a stake in an organization in the way that a
shareholder possesses shares. Furthermore, a stakeholder here is
deﬁned as any group or individual that “can affect or is affected by
the achievement of an organization’s objectives” (Freeman,
2010:46). Within the stakeholder framework, the difference
between the social and economic goals of a corporation is no
longer relevant, because the central issue is the survival and
success of the corporation (Harvey, 2014; Lee, 2008; Virah-Sawmy,
2015). Survival of a corporation as such is affected not only by
shareholders, but also by various other stakeholders such as
employees, governments and customers (Donaldson and Preston,
1995). Jones (1995) correctly predicted that the stakeholder model
had great potential to become the central paradigm in the ﬁeld of
CSR.
In summary, I argue that the foundation upon which the
governance innovations in the extractive hot zone in Alberta have
been constructed is based on three distinct but interwoven
developments: (1) the theoretical and empirical evolution of
governance as a multi-stakeholder approach that is more than
government; (2) the subsequent critical identiﬁcation of what has
been termed a pragmatic, consensus-seeking, post-political
condition; and (3) the parallel emergence of CSR as stakeholder
management. By adopting these theoretical lenses of analysis in
the following case study, I provide a framework to explain how
governance innovation is taking place in the extractive hot zone.
4. Governing the extractive hot zone
Historically, the governance structure of Canada’s extractive hot
zones has been dominated by two groups of stakeholders, that is,
governments at all levels and industry (Rummens, 2009). Over the
past two decades, tensions have increased between local Aborigi-
nal communities and the Crown because of the proliferation of
industrial activities. The authorities have explored a number of
avenues to facilitate a smooth transition for peripheral, heavy-
impacted, rural communities, but without much success. In the
early 1990s, several of the smaller hamlets in the extractive hot
zone of Northern Alberta merged with the urban growth centre of
Fort McMurray to establish the regional municipality of Wood
Buffalo. The distribution of the increased tax revenues resulting
from the merger has been controversial, and several of my
informants reported a formula that was skewed between urban
and rural areas: “The smaller hamlets bearing the heaviest burdens
[industrial impact] suffer from strong competition for limited
public funds and attention” (interview with consultant, 2015).
With three rural representatives on the council, compared to seven
from urban areas, it is evident that the opportunities are slim forremote areas; they are left to their own devices, to fend for
themselves: “There is a great difference between the communities
with representation and those of us who have none. Without
representation you get nothing” (interview with Fort McKay Métis
community leader, 2015).
In and around Conklin, where Statoil has its activities, the level
of criticism is rising, pointing to the absence of municipal support
and presence:
“The regional municipality does not do anything. We have to
ﬁght for every single project; last time it was the multiplex
(community activity centre). We need a multiplex to get our
kids off the drugs and quit drifting around looking for trouble,
but we have had to ﬁght the municipality at every juncture. Not
even the newly installed water facility is for the community.
They sell the water to industry” (interview with head of Conklin
Resource Development Advisory Committee, 2015).
This critical situation represents a rich opportunity for
alternative actors to ﬁll the void, and for alternative governance
innovations to emerge.
4.1. Governance innovations to solve tensions
To create a more stable relationship between the component
parts of the extractive hot zone, the government has developed
ﬂexible governance innovations, with three recognizable features,
namely consultation, EIAs and IBAs. In the following sections, I
elaborate on the genealogy of these different governance instru-
ments, and how they can be said to constitute governance
innovation reformulated as corporate stakeholder management.
Each feature has its own academic and juridical literature, but the
scope of this paper does not allow me to engage with all of them.
Hence, I offer only a brief, schematic outline of their characteristics,
before elaborating on their empirical manifestations.
4.2. The duty to consult
Alberta extractive hot zones geographically overlap Aboriginal
traditional lands and treaty areas. The duty to consult is triggered
by an apparent violation of an existing Aboriginal or treaty right
recognized and afﬁrmed by the Constitution Act (1982), or in cases
where Aboriginal communities assert rights that have yet to be
formally recognized by a court of law or treaty (Jacobsson and
Garsten, 2012). This common law duty stems from the Crown’s
ﬁduciary obligation towards Aboriginal peoples and Section 35 of
the Constitution Act (1982), which are interrelated (Delgamuukw,
1997; Eyford, 2015; Gogal et al., 2005; Lawrence and Macklem,
2000). A number of court cases have debated and elaborated the
infringements of Aboriginal rights in relation to natural resource
extraction, each contributing to the increasingly complex and
multifaceted regulatory environment of the Canadian extractive
hot zone (Gogal et al., 2005).
In most cases, this duty to consult is delegated to industry
proponents. Crown policy often requires a private company to
consult with adversely affected First Nations or other Aboriginal
communities (Delgamuukw, 1997; Haida, 2004; Sparrow, 1990;
Tsilhqot’in, 2014). This delegation is pragmatically justiﬁed
because the proponent has better insight into project details,
and is also best positioned to compensate for infringements
(Alberta Government, 2014; Fidler, 2010; Gogal et al., 2005;
Lawrence and Macklem, 2000). This practice of delegation is
conﬁrmed and backed by the Supreme Court of Canada (Gogal
et al., 2005), and is also supported by local stakeholders: “Most
communities would rather negotiate with companies than with
the government or municipality” (interview with consultant,
2015). Although this is partly because of the historically bad
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also because the municipality has no resources to spare.
However, the duty to consult does not apply to Conklin and
many other Métis hamlets because of the undecided consultative
status of Métis communities in Alberta.4 Alberta recognizes a duty
to consult with some Métis communities when Crown land
management and resource development decisions may adversely
impact their traditional uses. “Currently, the province does not
have a Métis consultation policy but has put in place an internal
process to guide consultation with Métis communities on a case-
by-case basis where there is a credible assertion of Métis
Aboriginal rights” (email correspondence with community associ-
ated lawyer, 2014).
In the case of Conklin, the fact that consultation is delegated to
industry is important: “Our stakeholder focus is on communities
within 30 km of the facility” (Statoil Canada, 2007). Industry is less
concerned about formalities regarding Aboriginal status, and more
worried about pragmatics: who are the stakeholders that can
inﬂuence, or be inﬂuenced by, our performance? “We ﬁrmly
believe that community consultation is a starting point for building
the long-term sustainable relationships we need for successful oil
sands development” (Statoil Canada, 2013).
4.3. EIAs
The second governance feature in the Alberta extractive hot
zone is EIAs. In practice, an EIA has a much broader scope than the
duty to consult, but it contains some similar characteristics related
to governance. As a key component of environmental management
over the past 40 years, EIAs have coincided with the increasing
recognition of the nature, scale and implications of environmental
change brought about by human actions (Haida, 2004). As for the
duty to consult, EIAs are delegated to companies (Morgan, 2012),
but are carried out in close collaboration with government
agencies.
Environmental disruptions are evident in the extractive hot
zones, and local stakeholders report the material consequences of
the industrial operations within the zone (Chipewyan Prairie Dené
First Nation, 2007; Conklin Métis Local #193, 2012).5 The material
consequences are signiﬁcant for Aboriginal communities, which
are surrounded by logging, exploration, development and produc-
tion activities by both forestry and hydrocarbon industries: “It’s no
use, it will never get better or get back to the way it was before. The
ﬁsh in the river are gone, the game has been driven out of these
areas, and the few catches we get are sometimes rotten inside”
(interview with elder, Fort McKay Métis Community, 2015).
These changes have affected subsistence practices and greatly
impacted the freedom of Aboriginal community members to move
about the land for traditional land use purposes. The community is
no longer free to hunt, trap, ﬁsh or gather berries and plants as it
was previously (Chipewyan Prairie Dené First Nation, 2007;
Conklin Métis Local #193, 2012; Connacher Inc., 2010). The lawyer
working closely with the Conklin community conﬁrmed this:
“Although there is no doubt that fewer Conklin residents
sustain themselves by hunting and trapping than did so even as
recently as 40 years ago, these traditional pursuits have not
been reduced to the level of hobbies. Most residents still take
part in hunting and ﬁshing for food as well as gathering plants,4 Although, in its June 2007 Métis Harvesting Policy, Alberta conceded that
Conklin is a rights-bearing community with harvesting rights (lawyer, legal
analysis, Appendix to traditional land use studies, Conklin Métis Local #193).
5 These sources are traditional land use studies kindly provided by Chipewyan
Prairie Dené First Nation and Conklin Métis Local #193. The sources contain data
collected from elders in the two communities, based on interviews, ﬁeld trips and
storytelling.herbs and berries for both food and medicinal purposes. It is
actually the gathering activities that are most sensitive to the
environmental effects of development” (email correspondence
with community associated lawyer, 2014;).
This mixed indigenous economy is in line with similar ﬁndings
by other scholars: “For Aboriginal communities, the mixed
economy is dynamic and intrinsically bound to the environment,
making the long-term impacts of industrial development espe-
cially critical” (LeClerc and Keeling, 2015:17).
The Statoil EIA for its Conklin project states:
“To ensure openness and transparency in the community, the
company has undertaken a regional EIA that fully discloses the
commercial development in the approximately 12 townships6
of bitumen leases held by the company. This application and EIA
discloses the development over the life of the project. The
regional EIA regulatory approach was developed through
consultation with provincial regulatory agencies” (Statoil
Canada, 2007).
A common theme in most scholarly discussions of EIAs is a
critique of the rationalist model of governance, pointing to the
need to explore and develop models that embrace new thinking
about planning and decision-making processes in their wider
social, cultural, political and economic contexts (Alberta Govern-
ment, 2013). This has encouraged the promotion of deliberative
and collaborative approaches to planning and decision-making
processes, including EIAs themselves, such as bringing stake-
holders and communities into the processes, emphasizing the
importance of communication as a means of negotiating consensus
solutions that capture the values of those participants, and moving
the professional technocrats from a controlling role to a facilitating
role in the decision-making process (Bartlett and Kurian, 1999;
Richardson, 2005; Wilkins, 2003). This view is conﬁrmed by the
Statoil EIA: “Several of the EIA programs, such as the wildlife
monitoring for caribou, moose and wolf, were tailored to actively
engage the local stakeholders and address their speciﬁc issues”
(Statoil Canada, 2007). EIAs are commonly criticized for being
biased in favour of proponents, and lacking peer-reviewed data
analysis (Aguilar-Støen and Hirsch, 2015; Davidson and MacK-
endrick, 2004; Fidler, 2010; O’Faircheallaigh, 2007; Wilkins, 2003).
Although Statoil’s caribou monitoring project has been one of a
rare collection of peer-reviewed EIA programs, it has also been the
subject of substantial criticism for being too limited and
unscientiﬁc (Boutin et al., 2012).
However, an EIA in itself is not constructed to mitigate or
mediate environmental or social disturbances of planned indus-
trial operations. For that purpose there has been a proliferation of
EIA follow-up initiatives, such as environmental agreements and
other negotiated agreements, that are intended to reduce the
widespread difﬁculty of ensuring effective follow-up of EIAs
regarding both anticipated environmental impacts and their actual
appearance (Elling, 2009; Wilkins, 2003), as well as to ensure
monitoring to prepare for the unexpected. I now focus on the most
common tool in relation to social impacts in the extractive hot
zones, that is, IBAs.
4.4. IBAs
IBAs are privately negotiated agreements, typically between
extractive industries and local communities, whereby government
is relegated to an external observational role. IBAs are commonly
viewed as agreements that establish formal relationships between
signatories, mitigate negative development impacts and enhance6 A standard geographical unit.
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(O’Faircheallaigh, 2007). The agreements primarily focus on
employment and economic beneﬁts, while more recent IBA
constructions acknowledge the need for greater ﬂexibility and
diversity of community involvement in industrial decisions and
the need for social and cultural programs, dispute resolution
mechanisms, revenue-sharing provisions and environmental
restrictions (Caine and Krogman, 2010; Diges, 2008; Dreyer and
Myers, 2005; Gibson, 2008; Sosa and Keenan, 2001).
IBAs are signed between extractive industries and Aboriginal
communities in Canada in general, and more speciﬁcally in Alberta,
to establish formal relationships between them, to reduce the
predicted impact of an industrial operation and to secure economic
beneﬁts for affected communities (Galbraith et al., 2007; Gibson,
2008; Sosa and Keenan, 2001). IBAs do not fall under the purview
of the state and thus fall within a historically uncontested, grey
area of legality, often referred to by lawyers as quasi-legal7 (Sosa
and Keenan, 2001).
To industry, these IBAs represent an opportunity to overcome a
complicated situation resulting from the difﬁcult relationship
between the state and its Aboriginal people:
“Government and the regulatory government for our industry;
it’s horrible, and it’s got a lot of history to it. You have to
appreciate that we [industry] are in the middle of this
relationship, a nation-to-nation relationship. When they
[Aboriginal people] are not being recognized, all of that comes
into the mix when industry tries to operate. And we have our
own interests in doing things right” (interview with CSR
manager, Statoil Canada 2015).
This attitude resonates well with other parts of the industry,
which claim that there may well be some very good business
reasons for the extractive companies operating in frontier regions
to want to pay attention and contribute to social development in
their back yard. Companies should tune their operating models to
help alleviate poverty, generate self-sustaining economic con-
ditions that will drive the company’s costs down over time, and
avoid community unrest and criminal behaviour (Harvey, 2014:8).
Conklin has negotiated a number of long-term agreements with
industry: “These agreements have provided communities with
direct funding support for physical, social, and humaninfrastructure,
as well as contracting opportunities for company businesses and a
process to address environmental issues involving future develop-
ments” (email correspondence with community lawyer, 2014).
Clearly, IBAs avert the issue with regard to the consultative status of
the Métis, making IBAs arguably the most useful of the three
governance features for the Métis communities of Conklin and
elsewhere. Since 2009, Conklin has taken an aggressive approach to
asserting its Aboriginal rights. Thus, the agreements signed by the
community are comparable in their terms to those signed by local
First Nations people. The agreements do not deal with compensation
for the infringement of Aboriginal rights, because that is a matter for
which the Crown is completely responsible: “Rather, the money and
business opportunities received from industry are intended to help
the communitycope with and respond to the massive change that oil
sands activity is imposing on it” (email correspondence with
community associated lawyer, 2014).
This approach is echoed in the statements from the company:
“We use a lot of resources in social investment, and I feel we
have a good understanding of the situation that way. We
operate in their back yard, so to speak, and want to be a good
neighbour. We try to interact, and compensate those who are
affected by our operations in an adequate manner. There were a7 Although they may become legally binding if the parties involved agree to this.lot of social problems in Conklin, and many were thrilled when
we arrived” (interview with CSR manager, Statoil Canada, 2014).
On signing an IBA, an Aboriginal group accepts restrictions to
the exercise of their traditional rights and Aboriginal title. They
provide industry with access to their lands, and give their support
to the resource development project. In return, they accept a
“package of measures” that include economic beneﬁts and the
minimization of negative impacts on the environment and people.
Additionally, most IBAs contain provisions to ensure consent and
co-operation from the Aboriginal community, and conﬁdentiality
and non-compliance clauses (Caine and Krogman, 2010; Diges,
2008; Gogal et al., 2005; Keeping, 1999). Prno (2007) argues that
Aboriginal peoples ﬁnd these agreements appealing because they
lend legitimacy to Aboriginal claims to land and rights (Caine and
Krogman, 2010). Most communities recognize that the regulatory
process is biased in favour of development, and communities seek
economic and contracting beneﬁts because “the choices they are
faced with are either having development proceed and receiving
some beneﬁt from it, or having development proceed and receiving
no beneﬁt at all from it” (email correspondence with community
associated lawyer, 2014).
Because of the grey area of legality concerning IBAs, there is
some ambiguity regarding the claimed conﬁdentiality surrounding
these agreements. Some claim that “these agreements are
generally kept conﬁdential at the request of industry, since
companies view them as business contracts, which under our
legislation are entitled to conﬁdentiality” (email correspondence
with community associated lawyer, 2014), while industry claims
that “Statoil will continue to honour our agreements with
communities, and out of respect, that would include their
conﬁdentiality” (email correspondence with CSR manager, Statoil
Canada, 2015). According to the Government of Alberta’s Aborigi-
nal Consultation Ofﬁce (ACO), social agreements (IBAs) have
nothing to do with their duty to consult. They are conﬁdential in
nature and there is nothing that compels companies or communi-
ties to divulge this information (email correspondence with head
of ACO, 2015). However, Statoil noted: “Our agreements cover areas
such as social investment, consultation, economic and workforce
development. Our commitments are fairly generic and describe
how we wish to work with our communities” (email correspon-
dence with CSR manager, Statoil Canada, 2015). “We really want to
link it to business risk. It is much more than being perceived as a
good citizen of the world, there is a business rationale behind it”
(interview with CSR advisor, Statoil Norway, 2015). “If we have
healthier local communities beneﬁting from our programs, they
are more loyal” (interview with CSR manager, Statoil Canada,
2015). These ﬁndings resonate well with similar claims from
industry: “Such outreach programs can work wonders for a while
with people who have known little previously in the way of
modern comforts” (Harvey, 2014:9) and public services.
In summary, the rationale for Aboriginal groups to enter into
these agreements includes overcoming marginalization, strength-
ening regional economic and political sovereignty and increasing
control of resources to ensure regional beneﬁt ﬂows returning to
communities affected by development. Resource development
proponents have an incentive to enter into IBAs with Aboriginal
groups to obtain consent from stakeholders to access the land for
resource development, obtain labour locally and create a co-
operative working relationship (Caine and Krogman, 2010).
5. Conclusion: the emergence of governance as corporate
stakeholder management
The extractive industry activities have had a great impact on the
social, cultural and environmental realities in the extractive hot
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Environmentally, as well as socially and culturally, the burden
shouldered by local ecosystems and Aboriginal communities is
substantial, and has added to a prolonged, historical conﬂict
between the Crown and its Aboriginal citizens over rights and
entitlements. This complex relationship has led to substantial
challenges for all stakeholders in the extractive hot zone.
In response to these challenges, the federal duty to consult,
along with provincial EIAs and locally negotiated IBAs, have all
been delegated to industry, representing component parts on
different levels of a nested governance structure, where corporate
responses in the form of CSR and stakeholder management are
positioned as an important centre-piece. This delegation has been
legitimized on pragmatic grounds, underscoring industry’s better
positioning to consult the stakeholders, assess its own impact and
negotiate compensation and beneﬁt agreements. I have identiﬁed
an interrelated, nested and multiscalar governance structure
emerging from these four distinct governance features (Consulta-
tions, EIAs, IBAs, CSR) that can be viewed as a joint mobilizing effort
by government, extractive industry proponents and Aboriginal
communities to realize a workable, win–win regulatory environ-
ment in the extractive hot zone (Fig. 3).
These are all recognizable features in the governance regime of
the extractive hot zone, where the emphasis is on a smooth
transition from a highly political space—understood as Mouffe’s
space of power, conﬂict and antagonism—to governance, or rather
processes, instruments and narratives such as “multi-stakeholder-
ism”, “community” and “partnership” (For elaborations on this
issue, see Eyford, 2015; Gogal et al., 2005; Kennett, 1999). This
structure is designed to govern the extractive hot zone, where
agreements are claimed to be in the mutual interest, where
communities and corporations are rhetorically inseparable and
where the survival of a company and the industry become the
common objective for all stakeholders: “Without the oil sands, the
community loses everything!” (Fort McKay Métis, 12.10.2015,
social media update). Hence, notions of this governance practice as
a positive-sum game are reinforced; the conﬁdential nature of theFig. 3. Governance transformed into CSR (author’s own graphic).IBAs ensures that this claimed mutual interest is upheld, turning
local communities into silent, complacent stakeholders.
Consequently, the Alberta government has put private interests
in the driver’s seat in the governance of the extractive hot zone by
encouraging companies to comply with international CSR stand-
ards, and by facilitating “beyond compliance activities” through the
combination of delegating consultation with Aboriginal commu-
nities to the companies, ensuring environmental impact (self)-
assessments conducted by the companies, and letting the
corporations negotiate IBAs bilaterally with the concerned
communities. This incremental change in corporate practices
can be viewed as a response to changing governing preferences,
where negotiations, consensus and positive-sum games akin to a
post-political condition are preferred to political competition over
resources. This is based on a corresponding increased maturity in
CSR implementation among primarily multinational companies.
Here, traditional philanthropic, standardized and image-based CSR
has been replaced by allegedly collaborative, performance-driven
and integrated practice. However, empirical evidence from this
case study shows that risk management remains the central driver
of CSR and stakeholder management. Future research must
determine whether industry has the resources and competencies
to carry this acquired responsibility for local development actively
and over time, and what happens when investments dry up and
industry leaves.
Furthermore, although there may be sound arguments for
this emerging, pragmatic governance structure centred around
CSR (and I humbly believe this article represents one such
argument), there are serious pitfalls related to the lack of
transparency and potentially inadequate participation of certain
vital stakeholders in the process. These pitfalls are partly
reﬂected in the remaining strong oppositional voices raised in
the extractive hot zone, particularly among indigenous commu-
nities and interest groups (Black et al., 2014; Dow, 2012; Foster,
2008; Le Billon and Carter, 2012; Nikiforuk, 2010). More
importantly, this governance cum CSR corresponds with the
general trend of a post-political condition within the extractive
hot zone of Alberta. We can predict some potential shortcomings
in the governance structure, particularly from its consent-
producing IBAs. With lucrative, conﬁdential business agreements
waiting at the end of a resource-demanding and tiring
governance process, the possibility of bias in favour of industry
development is high among the Aboriginal communities in both
consultations and EIAs.
The role of government as regulator in this governance triangle
is severely challenged by these bilaterally negotiated, conﬁdential
IBAs between industry and community. A ﬁrst step towards a
more transparent process should be to establish tripartite forums
for these negotiations, where the local communities, the
municipality responsible for local service delivery and the
company sit down to agree on social investment needs and joint
social programming.
However, the vital importance of stakeholder leverage in such
negotiations also results in increased focus on documenting
traditional land use among local Aboriginal communities. This
documentation is considered in conjunction with claims of
cumulative environmental impact by existing and planned
industrial developments: “Monitoring of prospect licensing by
the government and mapping of historic and present traditional
land use practices are important parts of our activities today”
(interview with consultant, 2015). Together with competence
building related to negotiations, these activities are all part of the
new reality of Aboriginal communities. Hence, the communities
themselves are calibrating their participatory role in the
emerging governance processes in the extractive hot zone to
strengthen their negotiating power. In this way, they underscore
T.I. Wanvik / The Extractive Industries and Society 3 (2016) 517–526 525the basic insight that there is no such thing as a post-political
society.
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